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NOTE 
INVERSE LIABILITY OF THE STATE OF WISCONSIN FOR 
A DE FACTO "TEMPORARY TAKING" AS A RESULT OF 
AN ERRONEOUS ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION: ZINN V. 
STATE1 
This Note examines Zinn v. State, a Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, 
which held that plaintiff stated a claim for inverse condemnation against the 
State of Wisconsin when, as a result of an erroneous quasi-judicial decision by the 
DNR, plaintiff lost the use of her property for a little longer than a month. This 
Note takes the position that Zinn represents the growing tendency among courts 
to enlarge the scope of fact situations in which they will find a taking. Given this 
tendency, and given that the substantive test in Wisconsin of what constitutes a 
taking is identical whether a taking occurs as a result of the police power or power 
of eminent domain, this Note argues that the remedy of inverse condemnation 
should also be extended to police power takings when the latter produce the same 
benefits to the Government and cause the same harm to the property owner as 
would have occurred if the Government had used its power of eminent domain. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The "taking issue" continues to bedevil the courts. 2 As regula-
tory3 and non-regulatory4 governmental activities become more 
pervasive and impinge on private property values, the contexts in 
which the taking issue can arise become more numerous, 5 and some-
1. 112 Wis. 2d 417, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983). 
2. Since 1977, the United States Supreme Court has faced the taking issue four 
times. San Diego Gas & Elect. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (compensability 
of regulatory takings discussed but declined for lack of final judgment); Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (zoning ordinance effected no taking); Lake Country Estates v. 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979) (complaint stated a claim for relief 
under section 1983); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (his-
toric landmark preservation regulation effected no taking). 
3. See, e.g., Devines v. Maier, 665 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1981) (enforcement of Hous-
ing Code resulted in a compensable taking of leasehold rights); McMahon v. City of Telluride, 
79 Colo. 281, 244 P. 1017 (1926) (property of owner destroyed under mistaken belief that it 
was a nuisance). 
4. See, e.g., Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. 
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903). 
5. "The categories of regulation that have often generated litigation are those re-
stricting mining, regulations for the preservation of open spaces, regulations that seek to elim-
inate existing uses, regulations of flood prone areas, wetlands, estuarine and beachlands, and a 
variety of regulatory deterrents to urban growth." F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, 
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times unpredictable. 6 At the same time, this contexual variety has 
rendered unsuccessful the judicial effort to formulate satisfactory 
standards for determining when governmental action, which has . 
caused loss to a property owner, constitutes a taking. 7 Nevertheless, 
because of the commands of the fifth amendment to the United 
States Constitution8 and the various state constitutions,9 if govern-
mental action results in a "taking" of property, "just compensa-
tion" must be paid. 
Ordinarily, a compensable taking occurs when a government 
agency or private entity, which has been given express legislative 
authority, 10 exercises its power of eminent domain to take private 
property without the owner's consent.'' In such cases, the public 
agency brings judicial action against the owner, and the value of the 
owner's property is determined before title to property is transferred 
to the agency. Occasionally, however, the government will take pri-
vate property without the exercise of formal eminent domain (con-
demnation) proceedings. 12 In such a case, the property owner is en-
titled to bring an action called inverse condemnation to recover just 
compensation. 13 Although there appears to be no single, settled defi-
THE TAKING ISSUE 141 (1971). 
6. In Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), for example, plaintiffs contended, 
inter alia, that the Military Service Act, 50 U .S.C. app. §§ 451-454, which requires the registra-
tion of every male citizen and resident, amounted to a "taking" of property without due pro-
cess of law. Rostker, 453 U.S. at 61 n.2. 
7. See Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by the Police Power: The Search for Inverse 
Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 2 (1971). See also Van Alstyne, Modernizing 
Inverse Condemnation: A Legislative Prospectus, 8 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1, 13-15 (1967). 
8. The fifth amendment provides: "nor shall property be taken for public use with-
out just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. This provision is made applicable to the 
states by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. 
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
9. The constitutions of twenty-three states are broader than the fifth amendment 
in that they require compensation when private property is "taken or damaged." See Note, 
Inverse Condemnation: Its Availability in Challenging the Validity of a Zoning Ordinance, 26 
STAN. L. REV. 1439, 1439 n.3 (1974). 
10. The procedure for the appropriation of land for public use depends entirely upon 
statutory law. See generally, 1 NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN§ 24.1 (J. Sackman, 
rev. 3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as NICHOLS'). See also Blair v. Milwaukee Elec. R. & L. Co., 
187 Wis. 552,555,203 N.W. 912,913 (1925); In re Milwaukee Elec. R. &L. Co. v. Becker,182 
Wis. 182, 186, 196 N.W. 575, 577 (1923). 
11. "Eminent domain is the power of the sovereign to take property without the 
owner's consent." 1 NICHOLS', supra note 10, at§ 1.11, 1-7; See Stoebuck, A General Theory of 
Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 556-69 (1972). 
12. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Zinn v. State,ll2 Wis. 2d 417, 
432, 334 N.W.2d 67,74 (1983). Chapter 32 of the Wisconsin Statutes provides the procedure 
which the government must follow in condemning property for public use. WIS. STAT. §§ 
32.01-.09 (1981-82). 
13. See Causby 328 U.S. 256; Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 432, 334 N.W.2d at 74. 
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nition of the concept of inverse condemnation, generally it "de-
scribes a cause of action against a government defendant in which a 
landowner may recover just compensation for a 'taking' of this 
property under the fifth amendment, even though formal condem-
nation proceedings in exercise of the sovereign's power of eminent 
domain have not been instituted by the government entity." 14 
Thus, a claim in inverse condemnation may arise if some govern-
mental activity, either by physical interference or regulation, de-
prives the owner of the use and enjoyment of his property such as to 
constitute a de facto taking of the property. 
In Zinn v. State, 15 the Wisconsin Supreme Court was presented 
with an unusual case sounding in inverse condemnation. The plain-
tiff sought to recover damages for the "temporary taking," on pa-
per, of her property by the Wisconsin Department of Natural Re-
sources (DNR). 16 The alleged temporary taking occurred as a result 
of an erroneous determination by the DNR 17 that the ordinary 
highwater mark (OHWM) 18 of a certain lake, completely sur-
rounded by plaintiff's property, was ten feet higher than it actually 
was. 19 The DNR ruling, therefore, increased, on paper, the size of 
the lake from fourteen acres to one thousand and nine hundred 
acres, two hundred of which had belonged to the plaintiff. 20 
The plaintiff petitioned for and obtained a rehearing from the 
DNR, which resulted in a new ruling withdrawing and rescinding 
the original ruling. However, the recission was not completed until 
nearly two years after the original ruling. 21 Therefore, the plaintiff 
14. San Diego Gas & Elect. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 638 n.2 (1981); 
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,258 n.2 (1980); United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 
257 (1980); see also, Maxey v. Redevelopment Authority of Racine, 94 Wis. 2d 375, 288 
N.W.2d 794 (1980) (refusal of city to relicense a theatre entitles lessee to bring inverse con-
. demnation claim). 
15. 112 Wis. 2d 417, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983). 
16. Id. at 421-22, 334 N.W.2d at 69-70. 
17. This determination was made in a contested proceeding under Wis. STAT.§ 227 
( 1981-82). See infra note 98. In a con tested case the parties are given reasonable notice, and an 
opportunity to present evidence and to rebut, or offer countervailing, evidence. The agency or 
hearing examiner makes its determination on the basis of the record before it. The record 
includes applications, pleadings, motions, intermediate rulings, exhibits, admissions and stip-
ulations. See WIS. STATS. § 227.07 (1981-82). 
18. OHWM means the point at which the "presence and action of the water is so 
continuous as to leave a distinct mark either by erosion, destruction of vegetation or other 
easily recognized characteristic." Diana Shooting Club v. Rusting, 156 Wis. 261, 272, 145 
N.W. 816, 820 (1915) (citing Lawrence v. American W.P. Co., 144 Wis. 556, 562, 128 N.W. 
440, 441 (1911)). 
19. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 421, 334 N.W.2d at 69. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
1434 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
sued the State to recover damages and compensation for the period 
in which the original ruling had been in effect. 22 
The State moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted.23 The trial court denied 
the motion. The State appealed the ruling. The court of appeals re-
versed and granted the State's motion. 24 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court granted plaintiff's petition for 
review and held that the complaint stated a claim for a temporary 
taking for which compensation is compelled under the Wisconsin 
Constitution. In so holding, the court rejected policy arguments the 
State advanced to preclude a finding of a taking in a quasi-judicial 
context. It also found irrelevant that the State had not consented to 
be sued in Zinn. 
This Note will examine the Zinn decision and show that, al-
though the substantive test in Wisconsin of what constitutes a "tak-
ing" is rather restrictive, Zinn represents the growing tendency 
among courts to enlarge the scope of fact situations in which courts 
will award damages for a taking. The court's finding of a taking in 
this unusual context, its articulation of when a taking occurs, its 
willingness to award damages for a very temporary taking, coupled 
with its unequivocal rejection of the defense of sovereign immunity 
to a taking in violation of the state constitution, indicate this ten-
dency. Part II of this Note will set forth the substantive standards 
in Wisconsin governing a claim for a taking, and then discuss their 
application to the Zinn case. Part III will discuss the remedies for a 
taking under the Wisconsin Constitution. In particular, this part 
will discuss the inverse condemnation remedy in Wisconsin and will 
examine the implications of Zinn for the status of this remedy in 
police power "taking" cases in light of developing federal law and 
the competing policies militating in favor of and against this partic-
ular remedy. The Note will then conclude that, on balance, the Wis-
consin Supreme Court's apparent inclination to grant monetary re-
lief to owners whose property is unconstitutionally interfered with, 
even for a very temporary period and in an unusual context, is justi-
fied on principle and warranted in practice. 
22. Id. at 422, 334 N.W.2d at 70. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
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II. THE WISCONSIN APPROACH TO INVERSE CONDEMNATION 
Unlike many other states, 25 yet like the Federal government, 26 
Wisconsin is a "taking" state. 2 7 This means that, unlike those states 
whose constitutions provide for compensation for a "taking or dam-
aging" of property, just compensation is due in Wisconsin only 
when a "taking" occurs. Consequently, in those instances in which 
an owner claims that governmental activities has so affected the use 
and value of his or her private property as to have, in effect, consti-
tuted a "taking," courts must determine whether such activity may 
be characterized as the legal equivalent of the formal exercise of the 
power of eminent domain. However, while a formal de iure taking 
can usually be easily identified by its procedural characteristics, 28 a 
claim of de facto taking, for which an owner seeks the remedy of in-
verse condemnation, presents the difficult constitutional problem of 
whether a "taking" has actually occurred and, if so, exactly when it 
occurred. To further complicate the problem, courts traditionally 
have distinguished between the power of eminent domain which, 
when it is used, compels "just compensation," and the police power, 
the excessive use of which, apparently, can be counteracted by a 
granting of injunctive relief. 29 Assuming that the distinction be-
tween the two powers is always rational or justified, determining the 
point at which the police power ends and eminent domain begins is 
often difficult. 30 In general, the distinction between the two tradi-
tionally has lain in the fact that police power involves the public 
regulation of property to prevent its use in a manner detrimental to 
25. See supra note 9. 
26. See supra note 8. 
27. The Wisconsin Constitution provides: "[t]he Property of no person shall be 
taken for public use without just compensation." WIS. CoNST. art. I,§ 13. 
28. See WIS. STAT.§§ 32.01-.09 (1981-82). The procedure set forth in WIS. STAT.§ 
32.05 is for the use of condemnors acquiring property for "public alleys, streets, highways, 
airports, mass-transit facilities, or other transportation facilities, or storm sewers and sani-
tary sewers or watercourses." I d. Condemnations for all other purposes are carried out under 
the procedures set forth in WIS. STAT.§ 32.06. For a description of the various steps involved 
in the process of acquiring title under these two procedures and related matters, see B. 
SOUTHWICK, 6 WISCONSIN PROPERTY LAW SERIES (1981). 
29. See generally Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power: An-
tidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1021 (1973); Sax, 
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings and 
Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057 (1980). 
30. The difference between the eminent domain and police power is a matter of de-
gree and not of kind. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 15, 201 N.W.2d 761. 767 (1972). 
"The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if 
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 
260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). See also infra notes 173-78 and accompanying text. 
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the public interest, whereas eminent domain involves the acquisi-
tion of possessory or other legal rights in property for public use. 31 
Since Wisconsin is a taking state, judicial determination of in-
verse condemnation claims is based on a construction of the eminent 
domain clause of its constitution. 32 This is true even when an in-
verse condemnation action is based on the claim that the condemnor 
has refused to exercise its power of eminent domain and pay com-
pensation despite the fact that it is "occupying" the plaintiff's prop-
erty within the meaning of Wisconsin Statute section 32.10. 33 Al-
though the standard of proof required under both provisions is the 
same, 34 under sec. 32.10 possession by the defendant of the power of 
eminent domain is a prerequisite to maintaining an action in inverse 
condemnation. 35 
In the circumstances of Zinn v. State, 36 the DNR did not have 
the power of condemnation nor the intention to condemn the plain-
tiff's property. 37 Nevertheless, the supreme court analyzed and de-
cided the case according to the usual test applicable to an inverse 
condemnation claim. In the process, the court clarified some of the 
ambiguities surrounding taking jurisprudence in Wisconsin. 
31. 1 NICHOl..'>', supra note 10, at§ 1.42, 1-127. 
32. See Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The Limits of Public Responsibility, 1966 
WIS. L. REV. 340-43. 
33. WIS. STAT.§ 32.10 (1981-82) provides: 
If any property has been occupied by a person possessing the power of condemnation 
and if the person has not exercised the power, the owner, to institute condemnation 
proceedings, shall present a verified petition to the circuit judge of the county 
wherein the land is situated asking that such proceedings be commenced. The peti-
tion shall describe the land, state the person against which the proceedings are insti-
tuted and the use to which it has been put or is designed to have been put by the 
person against which the proceedings are instituted. A copy of the petition shall be 
served upon the person who has occupied petitioner's land, or interest in land. The 
petition shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the circuit court . . . If the Court 
determines that the defendant is occupying such property of the plaintiff without 
having the right to do so, it shall treat the matter in accordance with the provisions 
of [Chap. 32] assuming the plaintiff has received from the defendant a jurisdictional 
offer and has failed to accept the same and assuming the plaintiff is not questioning 
the right of the defendant to condemn the property so occupied. 
34. Proof that there has been an "occupation" within the meaning of WIS. STAT.§ 
32.10, and a "taking" under Wis. CONST. art. I,§ 13 are functionally and legally equivalent. 
See Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State Highway Comm'n, 66 Wis. 2d 720,723,226 N.W.2d 185, 186-
87 (1975) (Howell Plaza I); Maxey v. Redevelopment Authority of Racine, 94 Wis. 2d 375, 
388,288 N.W.2d 794,800 (1980). The reason for the legal equivalence of the two terms is that 
"occupation," itself under§ 32.10 is based on a construction of the eminent domain clause. See 
Howell Plaza I, 66 Wis.2d at 723, 226 N.W. at 186-87 (1975). 
35. The agencies or persons who may effect a "taking" under§ 32.10 are specifically 
enumerated in the statute itself. 
36. 112 Wis. 2d 417, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983). 
37. See infra notes 148-60 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Wisconsin Test of What Constitutes "Taking" 
The test for what constitutes a "taking" under Wisconsin law 
traditionally has been rather restrictive. This restrictive test is not 
solely explained by the fact that Wisconsin is a "taking" state (i.e. 
Wisconsin requires proof of a taking to justify compensation), un-
like those states whose constitutions allow recovery for a "taking or 
damaging." Other taking states have construed their eminent do-
main provisions to permit a liberal approach to recovery. 38 
1. PHYSICAL INVASION 
In the past, the sole test for taking in Wisconsin required a 
showing that the government had actually physically occupied or 
possessed the plaintiff's property. Thus, in one of the first cases con-
struing an earlier inverse condemnation statute, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court held that "it is only where those authorized to exer-
cise the power of eminent domain are actually in possession of or 
enjoying the use of [plaintiff's) property ... that the owner will be 
entitled to sue in inverse condemnation."39 This rather strict test 
had been previously articulated by the United States Supreme 
Court in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 40 where the State of Wisconsin 
had authorized the construction of a dam which caused the flooding 
of plaintiff's land.41 Essential to the physical invasion test is the 
38. For example, although Michigan is a taking state, its courts have interpreted 
that term liberally. "[T]he term 'taking' shall not be used in an unreasonable or narrow sense 
... [I]t should include cases where the value [of property] is destroyed by the action of the 
government, or serious injury is inflicted to the property itself, or exclusion of the owner from 
its enjoyment, or from any appentenances thereto." Thorn v. State Highway Comm'r, 376 
Mich. 608, 613, 138 N.W.2d 322, 323 (1965) (quoting Pearsall v. Board of Supervisors, 74 
Mich. 558, 42 N.W. 77 (1889)) (road closing case). Thus, even damaging of property consti-
tutes a taking under the Michigan approach. I d. at 562,42 N.W. at 78. For a discussion of the 
liberality of this approach compared to the restrictiveness of the New York approach, see 
Note, De Facto Taking and the Pursuit of Just Compensation, 48 FORD. L. REV. 334, 346-68 
(1979). See also Washington Market Enterprises v. City of Trenton, 68 N.J.107, 343 A.2d 408 
(1975). 
39. Muscoda Bridge Co. v. Worden-Allen Co., 196 Wis. 76, 88, 219 N.W. 428, 433 
( 1928). In Muscoda, the court was construing an inverse condemnation statute similar to WIS. 
STAT.§ 32.10, supra note 33. However, it held that a taking occurs only when the governmen-
tal entity actually physically possesses or occupies the plaintiff's property. The Court thereby 
implied that nothing the entity does outside the boundaries of the property, however severe, 
may constitute a taking. Obviously, this is in sharp contrast to the Michigan approach, supra 
note 38. 
40. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871). 
41. In Pumpelly, id. the U.S. Supreme Court equated the effect of the backtlow of 
water from the dam with taking (even though there was no formal act of appropriation by the 
defendant company) and found the defendant inversely liable for, in effect, destroying the 
plaintiff's property. Id. For an analysis of this case, see Mandelker, supra note 32, at 40-41. 
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finding that "the public or its agents have physically used or occu-
pied something belonging to the claimant."42 Thus, under this test 
governmental activity which does not result in physical possession, 
interference or occupation does not constitute a taking regardless of 
the fact that the governmental activity has deprived the plaintiff of 
all the beneficial use of his property. 
In much of the litigation that raises the taking issue, as in the 
field of zoning, the physical invasion test is of little value since there 
is no interference with property rights in a physical or possessory 
sense. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has recently 
indicated that "a 'taking' may more readily be found when the in-
terference can be characterized as a physical invasion by 
government.''43 
Even where physical interference with property rights has oc-
curred, recovery under an inverse liability theory in Wisconsin is 
anything but certain. Under Wisconsin property law, governmental 
activity which "merely causes damage" is noncompensable when 
the damage is deemed to be "indirect" or "consequential" and 
therefore damnum absque injuria. 44 Although what is regarded as 
indirect or consequential damage is uncertain, "[t]he distinction 
seems to be between less and more remote damage and, in the last 
analysis, seems to be purely a matter of degree."45 In general, the 
term damnum absque injuria refers to damage to property when no 
part of it is taken by the government.46 In spite of the fact that 
there is no bright line distinguishing between governmental actions 
merely causing consequential damage and those resulting in a com-
pensable taking, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has steadfastly held 
to that distinction. 4 7 This rather conservative approach adopted by 
the court has substantially limited the basis of recovery for inverse 
liability. This limitation may be illustrated by two cases decided 
nearly two decades apart. 
42. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda-
tions of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1184 (1965). 
43. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). The Court 
stated, however, that it was not "embrac[ing] the proposition that a 'taking' can never occur . 
unless government has transferred physical control over a portion of a parcel." I d. at 123 n.25. 
44. 2A NICHOLS', supra note 10, at§ 6.31, 6-210. See also More-Way North Corp. v. 
State Highway Comm'n, 44 Wis. 2d 165, 173, 170 N.W.2d 749,753 (1969) (citing 2 NICHOLS', 
supra note 10, at§ 6.4432(1), 6-503) (change of grade resulting in loss of 42 parking stalls 
constituted consequential damage not a "taking"); Randall v. Milwaukee, 212 Wis. 374, 383, 
249 N.W. 73, 76 (1933) (obstruction of egress and ingress merely consequential damage and 
not a "taking"). 
45. 2A NICHOLS', supra note 10, at§ 6.31, 6-210. 
46. Id. 
47. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. 
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In Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Columbia County,48 the 
plaintiff alleged that its tower was taken when the defendant 
county, in the course of relocating a trunk highway, deposited a 
large amount of sand and gravel near the plaintiff's power line. The 
sand and gravel sank into the swamp and the plaintiff's tower was 
twisted and bent and thereby rendered useless.49 The court deter-
mined that this was a case of mere consequential damage, not a tak-
ing, and therefore denied recovery. In so concluding, it found: 
[T]hat the tower had no utility, direct or indirect, to the highway 
project, that the county did not need or desire the tower or the land on 
which it rested and did not intend to acquire or affect either the tower or 
the land, that the public obtained no benefit from injuring it, that the 
county had no reason to anticipate that damage would result from its 
acts, and that the injury to the tower was purely accidental. 50 
Strictly applied, this opinion would deny almost all inverse liability 
and erect a rule of absolute immunity for all consequential damage 
caused by governmental action. 51 From the point of view of the 
owner, the lack of intention on the part of the defendant county to 
injure the property interest of the plaintiff is irrelevant. Yet the 
Columbia County court found the absence of "need or desire" signifi-
48. 3 Wis. 2d 1, 87 N.W.2d 279 (1958). 
49. Id. at 3, 87 N.W.2d at 280. 
50. Id. at 7, 87 N.W.2d at 282. The court appears to be drawing a line between 
governmental action which amounts to a tort and one which is a taking, leaving open the 
question of whether the aggrieved party may recover under a tort theory, when it states that 
"the County may or may not be liable in tort depending on such factors as negligence and 
sovereign immunity; but plaintiff's property is not taken for public use within the meaning of 
Sec. 13, art. 1, Wis. Const." 
51. See Mandelker, supra note 32, at 45. The view expressed in Columbia County, 
was affirmed in Hoene v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 209, 116 N.W.2d 112 (1962) where 
plaintiffs sued for damages to their house which allegedly resulted from heavy traffic on an 
adjacent highway. They claimed that the city's failure to construct and repair the highway 
was responsible for the damage. In denying inverse recovery the court stated: "[c]ertainly the 
appellants' property was not 'taken' for public use in the usual sense of the word. Neither title 
nor possession was appropriated by the city. The appellants' property was not needed by the 
city to operate its street. This court has previously stated that 'mere consequential damage to 
property resulting from governmental action is not a taking thereof"' (citing Wisconsin 
Power & Light Co. v. Columbia County, 3 Wis. 2d at 6, 87 N.W.2d at 281). Hoene,17 Wis. 2d 
at 217, 116 N.W.2d at 116. But see Luber v. Milwaukee County, 47 Wis. 2d 271,177 N.W.2d 
380, (1970) which has modified the harshness of the rule regarding consequential damages. In 
Luber, the court held that rental loss suffered by a condemnee in connection with a taking of 
his property is an "interest" requiring compensation, and is therefore not mere consequential 
damage. The court stated that, "[t]he rule making consequential damages damnun absque 
injuria is under modern constitutional interpretation, discarded and sec. 32.19( 4) insofar as it 
limits compensation is invalid." Id. at 283, 177 N.W.2d at 386. 
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cant in absolving the defendant of liability under an inverse con-
demnation theory. 52 
In Public Service Corporation v. Marathon County, 53 the court 
did allow recovery under an inverse liability theory, finding a "tak-
ing." In that case, the defendant county had ordered the plaintiff to 
remove its utility lines along a town road and relocate them under-
ground so that the county could build an additional airport runway. 
The court noted initially that even this arguably clearer case 
presented a borderline situation. 54 However, it found that the 
county's intention to take the plaintiff's easement and the benefit the 
public derived from the enlargement of the airport tipped the bal-
ance in favor of finding a "taking."55 
The role of acquisitory intention has never been clear. The 
court in Marathon County did not explicitly proclaim that acquisi-
tory intent or public use is the standard by, which a "taking" is to be 
distinguished from "mere consequential damage." Nevertheless, the 
weight it assigned to both factors distinguishes this case from 
Columbia County. Indeed, there is language in the federal cases sug-
gesting that the "weight of authority [in this country is] . . . that in 
order to constitute a taking, the condemnor must have an intention 
to appropriate .... " 56 
Yet in Zinn v. State, 5 7 the court appears to have moved away 
from the above line of cases to bolster the position of claimants in 
inverse liability. In Zinn, the court rejected as irrelevant the State's 
contention that the DNR had no intention to take private property. 
In declaring that intention has no place in taking jurisprudence, the 
court quoted approvingly from Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion 
in' San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego: 5 8 "the Constitu-
52. 3 Wis. 2d at 7, 87 N.W.2d at 282. 
53. 75 Wis. 2d 442, 249 N.W.2d 543 (1977). 
54. I d. at 449,249 N.W.2d at 546. The court viewed the case as presenting a border-
line situation between taking and mere consequential damage resulting from the exercise of 
the police power. The fact that the utility retained its interest in the property, the court rea-
soned, could be viewed as mere police power regulation of the location of power lines. Yet, the 
court found the fact that the forced removal of the utility was useful to the public sufficient to 
make the exercise more like a taking than a police power regulation. I d. 
55. Id. at 448, 249 N.W.2d at 545. 
56. Porter v. United States, 473 F.2d 1329, 1336 (5th Cir. 1973); accord, J.J. Henry 
Co. v. United States, 441 F.2d 1246 (1969). See also B. Amusement Co. v. United States, 180 
F. Supp. 386 (1960); Sayre v. United States, 282 F. Supp.175 (N.D. Ohio, 1967). But see San 
Diego Gas & Elect. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
57. 112 Wis. 2d 417, 334 N.W.2d 67. 
58. 450 U.S. 621, 632 (1960). Although the majority in San Diego determined that 
there was no "final judgment" and therefore refused to reach the merits, four Justices dis-
sented and found a taking and a fifth Justice stated he would have agreed with the dissenters if 
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tion measures a taking of property not by what a state says, or what 
it intends, but by what it does." 59 
2. LEGAL RESTRICTION AND SUBSTANTIAL DEPRIVATION 
Conscious of the restrictive nature of the physical invasion test, 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court recently has modified the physical in-
vasion test to temper its harshness. 60 Under the new test, the plain-
tiff need not prove that his property has been physically invaded. It 
is enough that the defendant has placed upon the plaintiff's property 
a restriction which "practically or substantially renders [the prop-
erty] useless for all reasonable purposes."61 
Although the current test was apparently first announced in the 
context of litigation involving zoning, 62 its meaning in the context 
of inverse condemnation proceedings was tested in Howell Plaza, 
Inc. v. State Highway Commission (Howell Plaza 1).63 This case 
raised the issue of inverse condemnation for a de facto taking which 
allegedly occurred by reason of the threat of condemnation. 64 The 
there had been a final judgment. Thus, if the Court had reached the merits, it. would have 
·found a taking. See infra note 189. 
59. San Diego, 450 U.S. at 652-53 (quoting Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 298 
(1967) (Stewart, J., concurring)). · 
60. See Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State Highway Comm'n, 92 Wis. 2d 74, 284 N.W.2d 
887 (1979) (Howell Plaza II). 
61. Buhler v. Racine County, 33 Wis. 2d 137, 143, 146 N.W.2d 403,406 (1966) (zon-
ing). See also Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 15,201 N.W.2d 761,767 (1972) (zoning 
of wetlands). 
62. Buhler v. Racine County, 33 Wis. 2d 137, 146 N.W.2d 403 (1966). 
63. 66 Wis. 2d 720, 226 N.W.2d 185 (1975). 
64. The term "condemnation blight" has been coined to denote "the debilitating 
effect upon value of a threatened, imminent or potential condemnation." 4 NICHOLS', supra 
note 10, at§ 12.3151[5], 12-475. Condemnation blight occurs when: 
[t]he advance planning necessary for public improvements ... results in postpone-
ments and delays in condemnation proceedings. Long periods of time lapse between 
the initiation of a project and the actual award of compensation to the property 
owner. As this delay continues, property values in the area set off for the public im-
provement sometimes rapidly depreciate, because the tenants relocate in other areas 
and property owners are reluctant to spend money on repairs. There can be a sub-
stantial loss of financial return from such property, while the cost of maintenance 
continues. . . . The law of eminent domain has found this a difficult problem to re-
solve. 
Howell Plaza I, 66 Wis. 2d at 727-28,226 N.W.2d at 189 (quoting the trial court). The crucial 
issue in cases raising the condemnation blight problem is whether the conduct or activity of a 
condemning authority constitutes a de facto taking or merely condemnation blight. If the for-
mer, compensation is awarded as of the date the condemnor somehow interfered with the 
owner's enjoyment of his property, regardless of when title vested in the condemnor. Thus the 
date of taking is moved forward to coincide with the actual taking even though formal or legal 
taking occurs later. Under the condemnation blight concept, on the other hand, the date of 
taking remains the same, but the owner is compensated for the loss of value to his property as 
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plaintiff in Howell Plaza I alleged that the pre-condemnation activi-
ties of the defendant constituted a de facto taking. It alleged that the 
defendant had sent notices to tenants and property owners in the 
area informing them of the imminence of condemnation and that the 
City of Oak Creek, at the "insistence" of the defendant, had urged 
the plaintiff to withhold development of its land because of the up-
coming condemnation for the purpose of building the freeway sys-
tem. Further, the defendant allegedly had advised the plaintiff that 
its property might be acquired and that it had informally approved 
acquisition of the plaintiff's property. 65 As a result of these activi-
ties, the plaintiff argued that it was unable to develop its land and 
attract tenants to its property. 66 Moreover, the plaintiff claimed 
that the city planning office had informed it that the city would not 
grant a building permit due to the freeway project. 67 
The trial court found the complaint sufficient to constitute a 
claim for a de facto taking. 68 It reasoned that the long periods of time 
between the announcement of public improvements and the actual 
commencement of condemnation proceedings often result in sub-
stantial hardship and unfairness to property owners. 69 
On appeal, the supreme court found the trial court's reasoning 
"highly persuasive." 70 Nevertheless, concerned that inverse con-
demnation in these circumstances would in effect transfer property 
to an unwilling buyer which had not yet exercised its legislative 
function of deciding whether to condemn the property, the court 
held that in order to state a cause of action under section 32.10 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes, the property owner must allege facts in its com-
plaint that it had been "deprived of all, or substantially all, of the 
beneficial use of [his] property or of any part thereof.'' 7 1 
The court's opinion in Howell Plaza I left unclear the elements 
of the substantial deprivation test. First, while the opinion sug-
a result of the condemnor's value-depressing acts. 4 NICHOLS', supra note 10, at§ 12.3151[5), 
12-475. 
65. Howell Plaza II, 92 Wis. 2d 74, 97, 284 N.W.2d at 888 (1979). 
66. Id. 
67. Howell Plaza I, 66 Wis. 2d at 722, 226 N.W.2d at 186. 
68. Id. 
69. See supra note 64. 
70. See Howell Plaza I, 66 Wis. 2d at 727, 226 N.W.2d at 189, where the court indi-
cates that it agrees with the trial judge's concern that "there may be a fundamental unfairness 
in permitting a public agency to deal with property owners in such a way that they cannot 
make the optimum and normal use of their property .... " 
71. I d. at 730,226 N.W.2d at 190. In so holding the court stated, "we conclude that 
there need not be an actual taking in the sense that there be a physical occupation or posses-
sion by the condemning authority, and to that extent we modify the rule stated in Muscoda 
Bridge Co. v. Worden-Allen Co." Id. 
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gested that a showing of substantial deprivation of beneficial use 
alone, without a further showing of a legal restriction placed on the 
use of the property, is not enough to constitute a taking, the actual 
holding is not couched in such terms. Second, the opinion left vague 
whether the inability of the property owner to develop his land only 
for a temporary period is constitutionally significant. Finally, the 
opinion was unclear as to whether a legal restriction must emanate 
from an authority with the power to impose such a restriction. 
The court, however, clarified these issues in Howell Plaza I I. 72 
The Howell Plaza II court acknowledged the ambiguities in its first 
opinion, noting that the test under Howell Plaza I was arguably 
"broad enough to allow the finding of a 'taking' whenever a property 
owner is unable to beneficially use his property, even where this is 
only an indirect result of governmental action." 73 Thus, in order to 
narrow the test, it adopted two further requirements. First, "[a] tak-
ing can occur absent physical invasion only where there is a legally 
imposed restriction upon the property's use." 74 Second, the legal re-
straint must issue from an authority with the power to do so. 75 
Under this test, the outcome of Howell Plaza II was almost a 
foregone conclusion. Since the Highway Commission neither im-
posed any legal restriction upon the plaintiff's property, nor had the 
authority to do so, short of actually condemning the property, the 
court found two major elements of the test unsatisfied. The court 
noted that in many jurisdictions in the country "the mere plotting 
or planning of a public improvement" does not constitute a de facto 
taking. 76 
It is important to understand the requirement that a restriction 
must issue from an agency with the legal authority. As long as the 
condemnor issues no restriction there will be no taking despite the 
72. 92 Wis. 2d at 87, 284 N.W.2d at 893. 
73. I d. In other words, the court treated the appellant's loss as "mere consequential 
damage." The New York Court of Appeals had previously adopted a similar test in City of 
Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., Inc., 28 N.Y.2d 241,269 N.E.2d 895,321 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1971), 
where it declared that" ... a de facto taking requires a physical entry by the condemnor, a 
physical ouster of the owner, a legal interference with the physical use, possession or enjoy-
ment of the property or a legal interference with the owner's power of disposition of the prop-
erty." I d. at 255, 269 N.E.2d at 903, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 357. For a criticism of the Clement rule 
see Note, supra note 38. Under a somewhat similar situation the New Jersey Supreme Court 
has granted recovery. See Washington Market Enterprises v. City of Trenton, 68 N.J. 107, 
343 A.2d 408 (1975). 
74. Howell Plaza II, 92 Wis. 2d at 88, 284 N.W.2d at 893. 
75. Id. at 86, 88, 284 N.W.2d at 893. 
76. I d. at82, 284N.W.2dat 891. See 37 A.L.R.3d 127,132 (1971). But see Washing-
ton Market Enterprises v. City of Trenton, 68 N.J. 107, 343 A.2d 408 (1975); Klopping v. 
City of Whittier, 8 Cal.3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972). 
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debilitating effects of its activity and its intention to condemn an 
owner's property. Thus, in Howell Plaza II, even though the court 
found that the city planner had informed the plaintiff that its appli-
cation for a building permit would be denied, 77 the court held that 
this amounted to no restriction because the city planner had no legal 
authority to restrain the plaintiff from developing its land. Likewise, 
even though the Commission had informally approved the acquisi-
tion of plaintiff's property as a "hardship" case and had appointed 
appraisers for that purpose, 78 the court concluded that these activi-
ties were insufficient to constitute a restriction. 79 
B. Application of the Taking Test to ZINN v. STATE 
Zinn presented the Wisconsin Supreme Court with a major op-
portunity to clarify the meaning of Howell Plaza I I, albeit in a most 
unusual context. Specifically, Zinn provided the court with an occa-
sion to apply the Howell Plaza I I test in a non-condemnation, non-
zoning, quasi-judicial context, and to determine what type of gov-
ernmental interference with property is sufficient to constitute a 
compensable taking, and at what point a governmental action may 
be said to have effected a taking. In Zinn, the court was confronted 
with the difficulty of fitting the unusual facts of that case into the 
requirement of "restriction," as enunciated in Howell Plaza II, and 
the uncertainty regarding the compensability of a temporary inabil-
ity to develop one's land as a result of governmental action left un-
clear in Howell Plaza II. In order to better demonstrate the diffi-
culty of applying the Howell Plaza I I test to contexts other than its 
own, it is necessary at this point to set forth in some detail the facts 
of Zinn. 
1. THE FACTS OF ZINN 
Rose Zinn was the owner of a parcel of land which completely 
surrounded McConville Lake in Washington County. 80 She thus 
had sole riparian rights to the lake. In January, 1976, a neighbor of 
Zinn filed a petition for a declaratory ruling with the Wisconsin De-
partment of Natural Resources (DNR) to obtain a determination of 
the ordinary highwater mark (OHWM) of the lake. 81 Accordingly, 
77. Howell Plaza II, 92 Wis. 2d at 84, 284 N.W.2d at 891. 
78. Id. at 78, 284 N.W.2d at 888. 
79. Id. at 86, 284 N.W.2d at 893. 
80. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 420, 334 N.W.2d at 69. 
81. I d. at 420-21, 334 N.W.2d at 69. 
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on June 13, 1977 the DNR held a hearing on the petition. At the 
hearing, the hearing examiner received in evidence the testimony of 
a DNR employee as to the location of the OHWM.82 Based on the 
record thus developed, the hearing examiner issued a ruling on July 
22, 1977, placing the OHWM of the lake at an elevation correspond-. 
ing to Contour 990 on the United States Geological Survey. 83 
As a result of the ruling, the surface of the lake increased from 
about fourteen acres to more than nineteen-hundred acres. 84 Zinn's 
two-hundred acres of dry land now became part of the lake bed. The 
ruling also meant that abutting property owners, including Zinn's 
neighbor, would have riparian rights which had belonged solely to 
Zinn. 85 
Faced with losing her land and her sole riparian ownership, 
Zinn petitioned for a rehearing. 86 The DNR granted the petition on 
August 29, 1977. Almost two years later, on March 14, 1979, the 
hearing examiner issued a new ruling; rescinding his previous or-
der.87 The new ruling established the OHWM at Contour 980.3 
(mean sea level datum) as it always had been. 88 
Zinn commenced a suit in inverse condemnation seeking dam-
ages against the State of Wisconsin alleging an unconstitutional tak-
ing of her property in that the State of Wisconsin deprived her of 
"all or substantially all the beneficial use" of her property including 
the right to convey the same or to develop it during the period of the 
taking.89 The State moved to dismiss on several grounds including 
failure to state a claim and the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The 
trial court denied the motion and the State appealed. The court of 
appeals reversed, holding that Zinn failed to state facts sufficient to 
constitute a taking. The supreme court, however, reversed the ap-
pellate court and held that the DNR's original ruling constituted a 
taking. 
82. Id. at 421, 334 N.W.2d at 69. 
83. Id. 
84. I d. See also, Respondent-Petitioner's brief at 3, I d. 
85. See infra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. 
86. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 421, 334 N.W.2d at 69. 
87. Jd. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 421-22, 334 N.W.2d at 69-70. See Respondent-Petitioners brief at 10-11, 
I d. 
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2. WHAT CONSTITUTED A TAKING IN ZINN 
In holding that Zinn failed to state a claim, the court of appeals 
relied on language in Howell Plaza I J9° that a temporary inability to 
develop one's property as a result of governmental action is insuffi-
cient to constitute a taking. 91 The court reasoned that since the 
granting of the petit,ion for rehearing (one month after the original 
DNR ruling) nullified whatever effects the original ruling might 
have had, the erroneous determination was for such a brief period 
that it could not constitute a taking.92 More importantly, the court 
found that the pleadings failed to show any "restriction" that the 
State placed upon the property either as a result of the original rul-
ing or at anytime thereafter.93 Finally, the court pointed out that 
once a rehearing was granted, the DNR would have had no legal 
authority to restrain development even if it sought to do so. 94 
In reversing, the Wisconsin Supreme Court approached Zinn's 
taking claim differently. At the outset, the court identified the issue 
to be whether an erroneous administrative decision by the DNR can 
ever result in a taking. 95 The court found the resolution of the issue 
to be a function of three basic determinations. The first involved 
whether the DNR had the authority to make the declaratory ruling 
which might effect a taking. 96 In order to find a basis for that au-
thority, the court turned to the nature of a DNR administrative 
proceeding. It found that the DNR is authorized by law to make 
determinations concerning the location of the OHWM of navigable 
lakes and streams. 97 Further, the court found that the DNR has the 
90. 92 Wis. 2d 74,284 N.W.2d 887 (1979) discussed supra notes 72-76andaccompa-
nying text. 
91. Zinn v. State (Wis. Ct. App. Dist. II, 1982) (unpublished opinion) reprinted in 
Respondent-Petitioner's brief, at App. 114, 117-18, Id. 
92. Id. at App. 119. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 424, 334 N.W.2d at 71. 
96. Id. 
97. !d. at 429, 334 N.W.2d at 71 (citing WIS. STAT.§ 30.10(1), (4)(b) (1981-82). 
Section 30.10 entitled Declarations of navigability provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Lakes: All lakes wholly or partly within this state which are navigable in fact are 
declared to be navigable and public waters, and all persons have the same rights 
therein and thereto as they have in and to any other navigable or public waters. 
(4) Interpretation . .. 
(b) The boundaries of lands adjoining waters and the rights of the state and of indi-
viduals with respect to all such lands and waters shall be determined in conformity 
with the common law so far as applicable, but in the case of a lake or stream errone-
ously meandered in the original U.S. government survey, the owner of title to lands 
adjoining the meandered lake or stream, as shown on such original survey, is conclu-
sively presumed to own to the actual shore lines unless it is first established in a suit 
1984:1431 Zinn v. State 1447 
authority to make binding declaratory rulings.98 Since the DNR de-
termined the OHWM of McConville Lake and issued a binding de-
claratory ruling pursuant to law, the court held that the DNR did 
have the requisite authority to issue a legal restriction on the plain-
tiff's use of property.99 
Second, the court had to determine whether the DNR ruling in 
Zinn amounted to a legal restriction. It found that, prior to the 
DNR ruling, the ordinary highwater mark of the lake had been at 
contour 980.3.100 After the original ruling, the mark was placed at 
contour 990, which in effect placed about two-hundred acres of 
plaintiff's dry land within the highwater mark of the lake.101 Under 
Wisconsin law, all land below the ordinary highwater mark is titled 
to the State of Wisconsin.102 This meant that Zinn lost her sole ripa-
rian rights, and her shoreland became open to public use under the 
"trust doctrine." 103 Therefore, the court concluded that the failure 
of the plaintiff specifically to allege "actual restriction on the use of 
[her] land as a result of the ruling" was not fatal to her claim.104 
Finally, the court had to determine whether the DNR's lack of 
"intent and authority" to take private property under the circum-
stances of the Zinn case could preclude a taking. Finding intent to 
be legally insignificant, the court found the "effect" of the DNR's 
action and the "impact" of that action upon the plaintiff determina-
tive.105 For the court, it was sufficient that the legal effect of the 
in equity, brought by the U.S. government for that purpose, that the government 
was in fact defrauded by such survey. If the proper claims of adjacent owners of 
riparian lots of lands between meander and actual shore lines conflict, each shall have 
its proportion of such shore lands. 
In Wisconsin, "[w]hen it is said that a water is navigable it is merely a different way of saying 
that it is public-public not only for navigation, but for hunting, fishing, recreation and for 
any other lawful purpose." Muench v. Public Service Comm'n, 261 Wis. 429,506,53 N.W.2d 
514, 519 (1952) (quoting Kanneberg, Wisconsin Law of Waters 1946 Wis. L. REV. 345, 347). 
This access to public waters is known as the "public trust doctrine." 
98. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 425-26, 334 N.W.2d 71-72 (citing WIS. STAT. § 227.06 
(1981-82)). Section 227.06 provides in relevant part: 
(1) Any agency may, on petition by any interested person, issue a declaratory ruling 
with respect to the applicability to any person, property or state of facts of any rule 
or statute enforced by it. . . . A declaratory ruling shall bind the agency all parties 
to the proceedings on the statement of facts alleged. . . . 
99. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 426-27, 334 N.W.2d at 72. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Muench v. Public Service Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492,53 N.W.2d 514,55 N.W.2d 40 
(1952); Doemel v. Jantz, 180 Wis. 225, 193 N.W. 393 (1923). 
103. Zinn, 112, Wis. 2d at 426, 334 N.W.2d at 71. 
104. Id. at 427, 334 N.W.2d at 72. 
105. I d. at 430, 334 N.W.2d at 73. Similarly, with regard to the DNR's authority to 
take private property, the court found that its authority to issue a legally binding ruling 
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DNR's decision was to vest title to two-hundred acres of Zinn's 
property in the State regardless of what the State said about its 
action. 106 
While the force of the logic of the Zinn court to find a taking is 
considerable, the State and court of appeal's position concerning the 
import of "legal restriction" is understandable. The notion of legal 
restriction implies t,hat the defendant must have prevented the plain-
tiff from developing her land. In Zinn, however, the State contended 
that the DNR ruling, though erroneous, applied to and was binding 
upon the parties only as to matters within the jurisdiction of the 
DNR. 107 To be sure, the DNR had jurisdiction to determine the 
location of the OHWM of the lake but not to determine title be-
tween parties108 -a power reserved only to the courts. Neverthe-
less, the role the supreme court gave to the effect of the DNR deci-
sion in Zinn determined the outcome of the case. Thus, even though 
it is unlikely that Zinn could have been legally prevented from de-
veloping her land, on the basis of the DNR ruling alone, the ruling 
would have been sufficient legal authority to authorize Zinn's neigh-
bors to obtain permits to build structures, 109 piers, 110 docks and to 
ca~ry on dredging111 on her shoreline. 
3. OFFICIAL IMMUNITY AND THE TEMPORARINESS OF THE TAKING 
Zinn establishes that the immunity of officials when acting in a 
quasi-judicial context does not preclude the finding of a taking. Zinn 
raises the important question of whether, as a matter of policy, a 
taking should be found in a quasi-judicial context. The State con-
tended that since decisions by administrative agencies are made ob-
jectively on the basis of the records before them and the evidence 
presented to them by the disputing parties, the State should not be 
which had the effect of giving title to the State was sufficient authority to constitute a taking. 
/d. 
106. Id. In imposing such absolute liability, the court seems to have broken away 
from its earlier position in Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Columbia County, 3 Wis. 2d 1, 87 
N.W.2d 279 (1957) and Public Service Corporation v. Marathon County, 75 Wis. 2d 442,249 
N.W.2d 543 (1977). See supra notes 48-56. 
107. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 426, 334 N.W.2d at 71. 
108. Moreover, administrative agency decisions generally do not have res judicata 
effect. Fond duLac v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 45 Wis.2d 620, 173 N.W.2d 605 (1970); 
Board of Regents v. Wisconsin Personnel Comm'n, 103 Wis. 2d 545, 309 N.W.2d 366 (Ct.· 
App. 1981). As such, Zinn would have been free to defend her title in court if the DNR laid 
claim to title on the basis of its ruling. 
109. W1s. STAT.§ 30.12 (1981-82). 
110. WIS. STAT.§ 30.13 (1981-82). 
111. WIS. STAT.§ 30.20 (1981-82). 
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liable for erroneous determinations resulting from the insufficiency 
of the record developed by the parties. 112 Moreover, the policy of 
maintaining the integrity of the administrative adjudicatory pro-
cess should preclude the finding of a taking. 113 In support of this 
contention, the State relied on the decision of the United States 
Supreme Court in Butz v. Economou. 114 That case involved the issue 
of whether, to what extent, and what type of federal officials were 
entitled to immunity from damage suits for constitutional viola-
tions in the discharge of their official duties. The Court found that 
the need for immunity for federal officials varied with the nature of 
their functions and with the safeguards built into the execution of 
those functions to guard against unconstitutional acts. 115 Finding 
that "adjudication within the federal administrative agency shares 
enough of the characteristics of the judicial process" and further 
finding that there exist a number of safeguards as a concommittant 
of this process, the Court held that federal adjudicators should be 
absolutely immune from damage suits. 116 
The court in Zinn found the holding of Butz, and the rationale 
upon which it rested, entirely inapposite to the State's contention 
against the finding of a taking. The court correctly determined that 
the issue in Zinn did not involve the civil immunity of the individual 
examiner for engaging in a governmental action which resulted in a 
taking even though it was done in good faith and non-negligently. 117 
As the court reasoned, if the possible civil liability of the individual 
official was to affect the outcome of a "taking" determination, surely 
the same rationale could serve to preclude the finding of an unconsti-
tutional taking under an ordinance or statute enacted by 
legislators. 118 
The court also found unpersuasive the State's contention that a 
finding of a taking in this context would chill agency decision-mak-
ing.119 The court determined that "[t]he applicability of express 
constitutional guarantees is not a matter to be determined on the 
basis of policy judgments made by the legislative, executive or judi-
cial branches." 120 Moreover, since the notion of official immunity 
112. Appellant's brief, at 14-15, Zinn. 
113. Id. 
114. 438 u.s. 478 (1978). 
115. Id. at 512. These safeguards include insulation from political influence, prece-
dent, the adversary nature of the process and the correctability of error on appeal. I d. 
116. Id. at 512-13. 
117. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 430-31, 334 N.W.2d at 74. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
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would appear to be designed precisely to prevent the chilling effect, 
if any, of civil liability, the State's contention was misplaced. 
Zinn also establishes that a taking is no less a taking because a 
governmental entity's power to undo what it did tends to make the 
taking temporary. Yet the court's previous statement in Howell 
Plaza II that the plaintiff "had been unable to develop [sic] his land 
only temporarily" 121 seems to give precisely that implication. Thus, 
since the DNR ruling did not prevent Zinn from developing her 
land, the State argued that the DNR's restraint on Zinn's property 
was insufficient to constitute a taking and the court of appeals ac-
cepted this as one basis for dismissing Zinn's complaint for a failure 
to state a claim. 122 
While it is true that the significance of the Howell Plaza II 
court's reference to the temporariness of the alleged taking is un-
clear and can be misleading, the brevity of the alleged taking was 
certainly not the basis of the outcome of the decision. 123 Even if it 
could be argued that this decision rested on the temporariness of the 
injury, however, the court's holding in Zinn has swept away this 
aspect of the Howell Plaza II decision. Even though the Zinn court 
found it clear that the taking was only temporary, because the DNR 
had later rescinded its original ruling, it quoted the opinion of Jus-
tice Brennan in San Diego Gas & Electric v. City of San Diego124 for 
the broad proposition that the temporary or permanent nature of a 
taking, regardless of its context, is irrelevant to the issue of whether 
a governmental action has effected a taking. Quoting from that 
opinion, the court stated: 
The fact that a regulatory "taking" may be temporary, by virtue of the 
government's power to rescind or amend the regulation, does not make 
it any less of a constitutional "taking." ... This Court more than once 
has recognized that temporary reversible "takings" should be analysed 
according to the same constitutional framework applied to permanent 
irreversible "takings." 12 5 
The predicate of the court's agreement with this opinion was its de-
termination that the test for a reversible taking in Wisconsin is the 
121. See Howell Plaza II, 92 Wis.2d 74, 86, 284 N.W.2d 887, 893 (1979). 
122. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 427, 334 N.W.2d at 72. 
123. Even though the court in Howell Plaza II had stated "[a]t most, petitioner has 
been unable to develop his land only temporarily," its decision rested "[m]ore importantly [on 
the fact] that the commission did not impose any such legal restraint upon petitioner or its 
property." Howell Plaza II, 92 Wis. 2d at 86, 284 N.W.2d at 893. 
124. 450 u.s. 621, 632. 
125. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 428-29, 334 N.W.2d at 73 (quoting San Diego, 450 U.S. at 
657 (Brennan, J., dissenting)). 
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same as for an irreversible taking: the substantiality of the property 
owner's loss of beneficial use of her property regardless of the length 
of period during which she suffered such loss. 126 In other words, it is 
the quantum of harm and its impact upon the property owner rather 
than the length of time within which the harm occurred that is de-
terminative to the taking issue. And as the court reasoned, the fact 
that a plaintiff regains the full use of his property by reason of the 
government's decision to change its position is irrelevant to the tak-
ing issue. 127 The court pointed out, however, that the length of the 
taking period may be a factor in determining whether there was a 
taking in the first place. 128 Implicit in this statement is the court's 
recognition that the longer the period, the greater the harm and the 
more likely that a taking will be found. 
4. WHEN DID THE TAKING OCCUR IN ZINN? 
Another significant aspect of the Zinn decision involves the 
question of when a taking occurs. The significance of this question 
should be apparent from the closing statements of the preceding Sec-
tion. Because the length of period during which a taking allegedly 
occurs is itself an important factor in determining whether a prop-
erty owner suffered a substantial deprivation constituting a taking, 
the point of time as of which a taking is reckoned affects the amount 
of deprivation and therefore also affects the question of whether 
there is a taking. Moreover, the point at which a taking occurs af-
fects the amount of compensation because that point determines the 
length of the period for which compensation must be paid. 129 
In Zinn, the court of appeals determined that the DNR's grant-
ing of the plaintiff's petition for a rehearing suspended whatever ef-
fect the original ruling may have had. 130 Therefore, it found that 
the original ruling was in effect only for slightly more than one 
month. 131 The court based its conclusion on the provisions of sec-
tion 227.12(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes. 132 
126. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 429, 284 N.W.2d at 73. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 427 n.5, 334 N.W.2d at 72 n.5. 
129. Id. 
130. Zinn v. State (Ct. App. Dist. II, 1982) (unpublished opinion) reprinted in Re-
spondent-Petitioner's brief at App. 114, 118. 
131. I d. at App. 119, Zinn. 
132. WIS. STAT.§ 227.12(2) (1981-82) provides: 
The filing of a petition for rehearing shall not suspend or delay the effective date of 
the order, and the order shall take effect on the date fixed by the agency and shall 
continue in effect unless the petition is granted or until the order is superseded, modi-
fied, or set aside as provided by law. 
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The plaintiff's claim for compensation, on the other hand, was 
for a much longer period. She alleged that the effect of the original 
ruling on the use of her property remained until the DNR rescinded 
its ruling more than a year and a half later. 133 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not determine whether the 
alleged taking remained in effect until the DNR made its second de-
termination and rescinded its original ruling. 134 However, for pur-
poses of ruling on Zinn's appeal, the court found it sufficient that 
there was at least a temporary taking. 13 5 In reaching this result, the 
court quoted the rule that Justice Brennan proposed in San Diego to 
govern regulatory as well as other takings: 136 
[O]nce a court establishes that there was a regulatory "taking," the Con-
stitution demands that the government entity pay just compensation 
for the period commencing on the date the regulation first effected the 
"taking," and ending on the date the government entity chooses tore-
scind or otherwise amend the regulation. 13 7 
On the basis of this rule, the Zinn court held that Zinn lost title to 
her property for one month as of the original ruling and had her title 
clouded for the balance of the period ending on the date on which the 
DNR rescinded its ruling. 138 This must mean that the date of legal 
restriction in Zinn coincided with the date on which the DNR made 
its original ruling. It must also mean that as of that date Zinn began 
to suffer the impact of the legal restriction on her power to use her 
property. 
The Brennan rule which the Zinn court cited, however, is am-
biguous. 139 In the context of a zoning regulation, for example, the 
date on which a regulation "effects" a taking can be three points of 
time: 1) the date on which the regulation is epacted; 2) the date on 
which the owner is denied a variance or permit; and 3) the date on 
which the regulation is actually enforced. Since the general rule is 
that one must exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a 
suit for a taking, 140 the mere enactment of a regulation cannot effect 
a taking. 
133. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 427 n.5, 334 N.W.2d at 72 n.5. 
134. I d. at 427-28 n.5, 334 N.W.2d at 72 n.5. The court remanded the factual deter-
minations of the length of the taking and the damages flowing therefrom to the trial court. I d. 
135. Id. at 427, 427 n.5, 334 N.W.2d at 72, 72 n.5. 
136. Id. at 428, 334 N.W.2d at 72. 
137. San Diego, 450 U.S. at 653-54. 
138. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 427 n.5, 334 N.W.2d at 72 n.5. 
139. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
140. Hagman, Temporary or Interim Damages Awards in Land Use Control Cases, 4 
ZoNiNG & PLAN. L. REP. 129, 135 (1981). But see, Nodell lnv. Corp. v. Glendale, 78 Wis. 2d 
416, 254 N.W.2d 310 (1977), where the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized a "well-defined 
1984:1431 Zinn v. State 1453 
In the administrative context too, three points of time can be 
relevant: 1) the date of an original ruling; 2) the date of rescission or 
modification; and 3) the date of actual enforcement. Justice Abra-
hamson's concurring opinion in Zinn141 seems to point up the signif-
icance of the ambiguity in Justice Brennan's rule as it relates to the 
doctrine qf exhaustion of administrative remedies. 142 Justice Abra-
hamson reasoned that the fact that the DNR had the right to recon-
sider its original ruling and that it granted Zinn a rehearing may 
mean that the DNR ruling was always subject to modification. This 
inchoate quality of the ruling, the Justice continued, may therefore 
never have given the ruling that degree of "finality" needed to effect 
a taking. 143 Thus, the Justice concluded that, even though Zinn sur-
vived the motion to dismiss, the trial court may still determine that 
under applicable law 144 the DNR's original ruling might never have 
taken effect. 145 Justice Abrahamson's concurrence is consistent with 
the general rule in eminent domain cases that the time of taking and 
evaluation of the award stems from the date that a governmental 
entity acquires effective dominion and control over the owner's 
property and not from the announcement or enactment of an ordi-
nance or plan. 146 
Ill. WHAT REMEDY IS COMPELLED ONCE A "TAKING" IS FOUND? 
In the past, the finding of a taking in Wisconsin did not neces-
sarily compel the remedy of compensation or money damages. Two 
questions have often surrounded this remedy. The first question is 
distinction in applying this judicial policy [of exhaustion of remedies] to the statutory admin-
istrative remedies in zoning cases .... [A] challenge to the constitutional validity of a zoning 
ordinance presents a question of law. Such a challenge may properly be made by commencing 
an action for declaratory judgment and the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is not applica-
ble." Id. at 426, 254 N.W.2d at 316 (quoting Kmiec v. Town of Spider Lake, 60 Wis. 2d 640, 
645, 211 N.W.2d 471, 473 (1973)). "The reason for this exception is that an appeal to an 
administrative agency would not have afforded the party adequate relief since the administra-
tive agency has no right to repeal or declare unconstitutional zoning ordinances enacted by 
the legislative body from which the board derives its existence." I d. 
141. 112 Wis. 2d at 438, 254 N.W.2d at 77. 
142. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
143. Zinn, ll2 Wis. 2d at 438, 334 N.W.2d at 77. 
144. WIS. STAT.§ 227.12 (1981-82). 
145. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 427, 334 N.W.2d at 72. 
146. Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966), aff'd, 405 F.2d 
138 (6th Cir.1968); City of Buffalo, v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241,255 N.E.2d 896,321 
N.Y.S.2d 345 (1971). In the official map cases too, the courts have held that no taking occurs 
until an owner applies for a permit on a mapped street. Platt v. City of New York, 276 A.D. 
873,93 N.Y.S.2d 738 (1949). See generally Kucirek & Beuscher, Wisconsin's OjJicial Map Law, 
1957 WIS. L. REv. 176. 
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associated with the police power/eminent domain distinction 147 
while the second is predicated on the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
and its effect on the availability of the inverse condemnation remedy 
provided in section 32.10 of the Wisconsin Statutes. 
A. Statutory Inverse Condemnation and Sovereign Immunity 
The rule in Wisconsin is that "[i]n order to commence inverse 
condemnation proceedings, . . . a property owner must demon-
strate that there has been either an occupation of his property 
within the meaning of sec. 32.10, Stats., or a taking, which must be 
compensated under art. I, sec. 13, of the Wisconsin Constitu-
tion."148 Although the court has modified the test for what consti-
tutes "occupation" to dispense with the traditional requirement of a 
showing of "physical occupation or possession" and has made occu-
pation legally synonymous with taking, the claimant in inverse con-
demnation under sec. 32.10 must nonetheless additionally show that 
the governmental entity "occupying" his property is one with the 
power of condemnation. 
One of the major issues that the Zinn case raised therefore was 
whether a sec. 32.10 remedy can apply against the State, or in the 
circumstances of this case, against the DNR. In Konrad v. State 149 
the court addressed this precise question, under chapter 32 of the 
statutes, as it then existed, for the damming of a stream by the Con-
servation Commission which effected a taking of plaintiff's land by 
flooding it. Even though the court found that the State was a "per-
son" within the meaning of the statute, it held that since the State 
was not expressly named as one of the entities who may condemn 
property the State could not be sued in inverse condemnation. 150 
Despite its holding that the State was an improper party in matters 
of inverse condemnation under the statute, it found that the plain-
tiff could recover compensation by proceeding against the Conserva-
tion Commission itself. Consequently, it held that the existence of 
the statute entitling the plaintiff to proceed against the State agency 
satisfied the Constitutional guarantee of art. I, sec. 13 of the Wis-
consin Constitution. 151 
147, See infra notes 173-81 and accompanying text. 
148. Maxey v. Redevelopment Authority of Racine, 94 Wis. 2d 375, 388, 288 N. W .2d 
794, 800; accord, Howell Plaza I, 66 Wis. 2d at 726, 730, 266 N.W.2d at 188, 190. 
149. 4 Wis. 2d 532, 91 N.W.2d 203 (1958). 
150. Id. at 538-39, 91 N.W.2d at 206. 
151. Id. at 539, 91 N.W.2d at 207. 
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court has steadfastly held to its posi-
tion that inverse condemnation under the statute is inapplicable 
against the state unless the state is specifically mentioned. Thus in 
Herro v. Wisconsin Fed. Surp. P. Deve. Corp., 152 the court stated 
that "[i]nverse condemnation does not apply against the state be-
cause the state has not consented to be sued." 153 While the meaning 
of this statement is not entirely clear, it seems to say that the state is 
immune from a suit in inverse condemnation unless there is a statute 
expressly waiving this immunity and permitting such suits accord-
ing to conditions and procedures prescribed therein. 
As in Konrad, so in Zinn, the court accepted the State's conten-
tion that the Wisconsin eminent domain law, embodied in chapter 
32, by itself does not authorize an inverse condemnation suit di-
rectly against the State. 154 As in Konrad, so also in Zinn, the court 
found that sec. 32.02 which expressly names the agencies to which 
the legislation has delegated condemnation powers excludes the 
State from that list despite the fact that sec. 32.01 defines the term 
"person" as including the State. 155 Thus, the court was unwilling to 
broaden the scope of the inverse condemnation remedy under sec. 
32.10 beyond that expressly permitted by the legislature, since to do 
so would have subjected the state to suit without its consent as legis-
latively expressed and as embodied in art. IV, sec. 27 156 of the Wis-
consin Constitution. "Under this provision the legislature has the 
exclusive right to consent to suits against the state." 157 
152. 42 Wis. 2d 87, 166 N.W.2d 433 (1969). 
153. Id. at 117, 116 N.W.2d at 449. 
154. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 434, 334 N.W.2d at 75. However, W1s. STAT.§ 32.02(12) 
(1981-82) would seem to allow inverse condemnation suits directly against the state because 
that section refers to any "person" which, under§ 32.01, covers also the state. 
155. See Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 434, 334 N.W.2d at 75. 
156. WIS. CONST. art. IV,§ 27 provides: 
The legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in what courts suits may be 
brought against the state. 
157. Zinn,l12Wis. 2dat434-35, 334N.W.2dat 75 (citing Fiala v. Voight, 93 Wis. 2d 
337, 342, 286 N.W.2d 924, 927 (1980) (wrongful conversion of plaintiff's fish by DNR of-
ficers)). See also Cords v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 42, 49-50, 214 N.W.2d 405, 409 (1974). The doc-
trine of sovereign immunity is procedural in nature and when successfully raised deprives the 
court of personal jurisdiction over the state. Consequently, the state cannot be sued without 
its consent. Lister v. Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 282,291,240 N.W.2d 610,617 (1976). On 
the other hand, the court has abrogated the so-called governmental immunity defense of the 
state or any of its political subdivisions for tort actions, among others, on the theory that this 
immunity, unlike sovereign immunity, was judicially created, and therefore could be abol-
ished notwithstanding legislative inertia to correct inequities and anomalies of the doctrine. 
Hoeytz v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 37, 115 N.W.2d 618, 623 (1962). 
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Similarly, the court found the same barrier also precluded a suit 
against the DNR. 158 Although the DNR has the power of condem-
nation in limited circumstances, which requires the consent of the 
legislature, 15 9 that was not the situation here. Thus, unlike the situ-
ation in Konrad, where the court found that the plaintiff's right to 
sue the state agency provided the necessary remedy, in Zinn the bar-
rier of sovereign immunity stood as a total bar leaving the plaintiff 
without any remedy. 160 Zinn, therefore, urged the court to recon-
sider the interpretation it had placed on sec. 32.10 in Konrad. 161 She 
argued that the State, as sovereign, has a plenary power of condem-
nation as an attribute of its sovereignty, and as such the legislative 
exclusion of the State from those empowered to condemn should not 
be a limitation on the State's liability. 162 
The plaintiff's logic has an apparent compelling force; afterall, 
the state qua state is the ultimate possessor and fountain of the 
power of condemnation. However, while this is true as an abstract 
proposition, historically the power of eminent domain has been an 
exclusively legislative function. 163 The legislature, as the represent-
ative of the people, must in the first instance determine who may be 
empowered to condemn, for what purposes, and under what proce-
dures. Otherwise, the courts would be usurping legislative functions. 
This explains why the courts faithfully repeat the generally ac-
cepted axiom of law that "[e]minent domain statutes are in deroga-
tion of the common law rules and must be strictly construed." 164 
There are limitations, however, to the prerogative of the legisla-
ture to hide behind the shield of sovereign immunity, as embodied in 
art. IV, sec. 27 of the Constitution, and to its exclusive power to 
determine the circumstances under which an inverse condemnation 
158. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 434, 334 N. W .2d at 75. The court's ruling is consistent with 
generally prevailing law in all jurisdictions because "the remedy of inverse condemnation, by 
the very premise which gives rise to it, is available only as against defendants who possess the 
power of eminent domain." 3 NICHOLS', supra note 10, at§ 8.1[4), 18-39. But see Fountain v. 
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 678 F.2d 1038 (11th Cir. 1982) where a contrary 
result was reached. 
159. See WIS. STAT.§ 32.02 (1981-82) entitled Who May Condemn, provides: 
The department of natural resources with the approval of the appropriate standing 
committees of each house of the legislature was determined by the presiding officer 
thereof and as authorized by law, for acquisition of lands. 
. 160. Zinn v. State (Ct. App. Dist. II, 1982) (unpublished opinion) reprinted in Re-
spondent-Petitioner's brief at App. 114. 
161. Id. at 17-20. 
162. !d. at 21. 
163. See Stoebuck, supra note 11, at 569. 
164. Maxey v. Redevelopment Authority of Racine, 94 Wis.2d 375, 399, 288 N. W.2d 
794,805. 
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remedy will lie against the state. To deny such a remedy on the basis 
of sovereign immunity or the inadequacies of sec. 32.10 would have 
rendered nugatory the compensation clauses of the federal and state 
constitutions. Consequently, the court in Zinn was forced to reinter-
pret, or at least clarify, the import of Konrad and the relationship 
between art. IV, sec. 27 and art. I, sec. 13 of the state constitution. 
Accordingly, it concluded that the failure of the legislature to make 
provisions for the payment of compensation when property is taken 
is immaterial. "If there is no legislation that makes provision for 
compensation for property taken, '[t]he Constitution does; and that 
is enough' " 165 because compensation for property taken "[i]s a con-
stitutional necessity rather than a legislative dole." 166 
The court found an implicit "waiver" to the bar of sovereign 
immunity, and thus found that the State had consented to suit, in 
the "self-executing" nature of the constitutional guarantee of just 
compensation. 167 It reasoned that the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity and the just compensation clause must be read together. While 
the legislature has the sole power to provide specific procedures gov-
erning recovery in inverse condemnation, thereby implementing art. 
IV, sec. 27, where no such remedy is available under a statute the 
injured owner is free to base his suit directly under art. I, sec. 13 of 
the Constitution. 168 Therefore, the court concluded that the reach 
of art. IV, sec. 27 is limited by art. I, sec. 13, and held that Zinn 
stated a claim directly under the latter provision, which permits 
compensation. 169 Thus, Zinn was allowed to prove damages at trial 
on remand. 
B. The Implications of ZINN for an Inverse Condemnation Remedy 
in Police Power "Takings" 
In holding that Zinn was entitled to prove damages at trial, the 
court rejected the State's contentions that the exclusive method of 
error correction (administrative rescission) lay within the quasi-ju-
165. Zinn, 112 Wis.2d at 436, 334 N.W.2d at 76 (quoting Laurel, Inc. v. State, 169 
Conn. 195, 200, 362 A.2d 1383, 1387 (1975)). See also SBR v. Board of Cty. Comm'rs of 
Larimer, 43 Colo. App. 14, 18-19,601 P.2d 1082, 1085 (1979) (residence destroyed by govern-
ment while coping with flood emergency is a taking). 
166. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 436, 334 N.W.2d at 76 (quoting Luber v. Milwaukee 
County, 47 Wis. 2d 271, 277, 177 N.W.2d 380, 383 (1980)). 
167. Id. at 435,334 N.W.2d at 76 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§895B 
comment a (1977)). 
168. Id. at 437-438, 334 N.W.2d at 77. 
169. Id. 
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dicial structure170 and that creating a cause of action for an error in 
such a context has serious negative financial implications for the 
state coffer. 1 71 The court, however, found persuasive Justice 
Brennan's opinion in San Diego regarding the following three propo-
sitions. First, the fifth amendment requires compensation for any 
sort of taking, whether it is accomplished through formal condemna-
tion, physical invasion, occupancy, or police power regulation. Sec-
ond, the obligation to compensate arises as soon as the taking oc-
curs. Finally, mere invalidation of an offending police power 
regulation is insufficient to meet the compensation requirement. 1 72 
The court's agreement with these propositions raises the ques-
tion whether the court will treat police power "takings" in the same 
way as it treated the taking in Zinn. In the past, although the courts 
have frequently recognized the difficulty of drawing a sharp line be-
tween the police power and eminent domain, 173 they have just as 
frequently distinguished between the remedies available for consti-
tutional violations of the two powers. 174 The remedies have bee.n 
different, notwithstanding the fact that courts have found police 
power actions to be "takings." Thus, in the context of land use regu-
lations, the usual remedy has been invalidation of an overly regula-
tory restriction. 17 5 
170. Appellant's brief at 17, Zinn v, State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983) 
(citing Metzger v. Dept. of Taxation, 35 Wis. 2d 119, 129, 150 N.W.2d 431, (1967)); 
Kosmatka v. DNR, 77 Wis. 2d 558,253 N.W.2d 887 (1977); Sewerage Comm'n of Milwaukee 
v. DNR, 102 Wis. 2d 613, 621, 297 N.W.2d 40 reh. denied, 104 Wis. 2d 182, 307 N.W.2d 189 
(1981). 
171. Appellant's brief at 20-23 Zinn. 
172. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 428-31, 334 N.W.2d at 72-74. 
173. For example: 
The distinction between the exercise of the police power and condemnation has been 
said to be a matter of degree or damage to the property owner. In the valid exercise of 
the police power reasonably restricting the use of the property, the damage suffered 
by the owner is said to be incidental. However, where the restriction is so great that 
the landowner ought not to bear such a burden for the public good, the restriction has 
been held to be a constructive taking even though the actual use or forbidden use has 
not been transferred to the government so as to be a taking in the traditional sense. 
Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 15, 201 N.W.2d 761, 767. See also Stefan Auto Body 
v. State Highway Comm'n, 21 Wis. 2d 363, 369, 124 N.W.2d 319, 323 (1963). 
174. See French v. City of New York, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 350 N.E.2d 381,39 N.Y.2d 589 
(1976). The court there described the gravement of a regulatory "taking" challenge as being 
based on the invalid exercise of the police power under the due process clause rather than on an 
actual taking under the eminent domain clause. Similarly, the California Supreme Court re-
fused to equate excesses of police power use with "the lawful taking of property by eminent 
domain .... " Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal.3d 266, 273, 598 P.2d 25, 28, 157 Cal. Rptr. 
372, 375 (1979). 
175. For a recent example of an ordinance which was struck down because it effected 
a taking under the guise of the exercise of the police power, see Nagawicka Island Corp. v. 
City of Delafield, 117 Wis. 2d 23, 343 N.W.2d 816 (Ct. App. 1983). In that case, the Court of 
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Courts have refused to award compensation in police power 
taking cases on the theory that a purported exercise of the police 
power is different in kind from "[a]n actual appropriation ... by 
title or governmental occupation." 176 On the other hand, they have 
been quick to find and award compensation for takings where gov-
ernmental activity has caused physical damage to property or has 
interfered with property rights. 177 The courts have supported the 
award of compensation in the latter cases on the theory that injunc-
tive relief is either against the public interest or insufficient to rem-
edy a harm that the owner has already suffered. 178 
The doctrinal distinction between the police power and eminent 
domain has been used to foreclose the inverse condemnation remedy 
in land use regulation cases raising the taking issue. Thus, in Agins v. 
City of Tiburon, 179 the California Supreme Court held that the only 
remedy open to a landowner aggrieved by a harsh land use regula-
tion is to challenge the constitutional validity of the ordinance or 
the manner of its application to his property through mandamus or 
declaratory judgment; he may never seek compensation on the the-
ory of inverse condemnation, however. 180 Indeed, the New York 
Court of Appeals has stated that the cases which have referred to a 
"taking" in the context of an invalid exercise of the police power 
were using the term only "metaphorically." 181 
In the past, the Wisconsin Supreme Court itself seems to have 
intended a similar metaphor. To be sure, it has acknowledged that 
the argument that a police power regulation will never constitute a 
taking, "[c]arried to its ultimate conclusion would make unneces-
Appeals invalidated the city's A-1 agricultural classification which required a minimum lot of 
three acres before any building could take place in an agricultural zone. Since the island prop-
erty involved only two acres, the classification effectively prevented the owners from building 
on their property. The court held that the city's asserted justifications of health, safety and 
welfare were insufficient to sustain "complete confiscation" of the owners' land use. I d. at 28, 
343 N.W.2d at 849. 
176. French v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 595, 350 N.E.2d 381, 386, 385 
N.Y.S.2d 5, 9-10 (1976). 
177. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166, illustrates the physical dam-
age proposition while United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 250 (1946) exemplifies the interfer-
ence with title doctrine. 
178. "Inverse condemnation ... provides the remedy where an injunction would not 
be in the public interest .... "Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Or. 178, 81-82, 376 P.2d 
100, 106 (1962). 
179. 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979). 
180. ld. at 273, 598 P.2d at 29-30, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 375. 
181. French, 385 N.Y.2d 5, 9, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385, 39 N.Y.S.2d 587, 594. The source 
of confusion regarding the question whether the excessive use of the police power can ever 
result in a "taking" is Justice Holmes' dictum in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 
393, 443 (1922). See supra note 30. 
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sary the power of eminent domain." 182 However, it has never 
awarded compensation for an unconstitutional regulation amount-
ing to a "taking." 
In one of the earliest cases which raised the taking issue in the 
context of a police power regulation creating without compensation 
a wild-life refuge on the defendant's property, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court found the legislative act invalid insofar as it 
amounted to a "taking" of property in violation of the state consti-
tution. 183 The court has consistently found such acts violative of the 
State constitution. 184 In the zoning field, the court has stated in dic-
tum that, "[i]f the limitation on use is in the nature of a taking in 
whole or in part for public purposes, then the constitution requires 
compensation to be paid, as otherwise there is a taking without 
compensation." 185 · 
Yet never before has the Wisconsin Supreme Court gone be-
yond voiding unconstitutional regulations to require the payment of 
compensation for the period in which an offending police power reg-
ulation was in effect. 186 This judicial reluctance to order damages 
during the interim period that a landowner's property may have 
been taken by an excessive use of the police power can sometimes 
produce harsh results. Yet, when the courts void an excessive regula-
tion or order an injunction it is because it would otherwise result in a 
taking. 
Under traditional doctrine, the facts of Zinn fit more the con-
cept of eminent domain than that of the police power. In tpe typical 
regulatory taking case, title or possession remains with the owner. 
In Zinn, on the other hand, the court accepted the plaintiff's allega-
tion that title or possession passed to the State, or at least that the 
182. State v. Herwig, 17 Wis. 2d 442, 447, 117 N.W.2d 335, 338 (1962). 
183. Id. In that case, the State, using its police power, created a game refuge over 
defendant's land which the defendant contended resulted in a taking without compensation. 
The State contended that the regulations in question, which forbade the defendant from 
shooting any game on his land despite the damage the latter caused to him, were in the inter-
est of wild life conservation. The court rejected the State's contention and concluded that the 
state could accomplish its purpose only by purchase, lease or condemnation because the use of 
its police power in this case exceeded proper limits. 
184. See, e.g., Bino v. Hurley, 273 Wis.10, 76 N.W.2d 571 (1956) where the court held 
unconstitutional, because it constituted a "taking" without compensation, an anti-pollution 
ordinance which prohibited owners of land surrounding a lake from bathing, boating, or swim-
ming in it. 
185. Buhler v. Racine County, 33 Wis. 2d 137, 143, 146 N.W.2d 403, 406 (1966). 
186. See City of Kansas City v. Kindle, 446 S.W.2d 807 (Mo. 1969) (discussing the 
old compensatory zoning approach); City of Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1978); 
Ventures in Property I v. City of Wichita, 225 Kan. 698,594 P.2d 671 (1979); Brazil v. City of 
Auburn, 23 Wash. App. 390, 598 P.2d 1 (1979). 
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State interfered with the plaintiff's title or possession. While this 
circumstance may distinguish Zinn from regulatory taking cases, 
the court found persuasive Justice Brennan's proposition in San 
Diego that the manner and context of the taking were constitution-
ally irrelevant. 187 
In San Diego, Justice Brennan laid bare the doctrinal asymme-
try implicit in the judicial willingness to find an unconstitutional 
regulatory "taking" and yet the judicial reluctancy to award com-
pensation in such cases. That case raised the issue of whether an 
inverse condemnation remedy is available to redress overly restric-
tive zoning regulations. The Supreme Court declined to rule on the 
issue because it determined that there was no final judgment from 
the state appellate court and dismissed the appeal for want of juris-
diction.188 However, four Justices dissented and, finding that there 
was a final judgment, reached the merits. 189 On the merits, the dis-
sent concluded that the "open space" zoning involved in the case 
effectively took the beneficial use of plaintiff's property. 190 As such, 
since "[n]othing in the Just Compensation Clause suggests that 'tak-
ings' must be permanent and irrevocable," 191 the dissent concluded 
that the Just Compensation Clause compels the payment of dam-
ages for a temporary reversible police power taking. 192 
Justice Brennan's conclusion in San Diego is based on two ma-
jor premises. First, both as a logical and practical matter, the pay-
ment of compensation is necessary to make the landowner whole for 
the period during which he suffered harm as a consequence of a tak-
ing.193 Implicit in this is the recognition that the traditional invali-
dation remedy is inadequate to make a landowner whole. Second, 
from the government's point of view, the benefit it derives from the 
regulation is no less than the benefit it would have acquired had it 
proceeded in formal condemnation. 194 
187. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 429, 334 N.W.2d 72-73. 
188. 450 u.s. 621, 633 (1981). 
189. I d. at 637. Justices Stewart, Marshall and Powell joined Brennan's dissent. In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist stated that if he "were satisfied that this appeal was 
from a final judgement or decree of the California Court of Appeals . . . I would have little 
difficulty agreeing with much of what is said in the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan." I d. 
at 633-34. 
190. Id. at 652-53. 
191. Id. at 657. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 655, 657. 
194. I d. at 652-53. Justice Brennan recognized, however, that "[a] different case may 
arise where a police power regulation is not enacted in furtherance of the public health, safety, 
morals, or general welfare so that there may be no 'public use.'" I d. at 656 n.23. Nevertheless, 
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Justice Brennan's opinion in San Diego has begun to play a sig-
nificant role in recent developments in the "takings" area.I 95 In 
Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, I96 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
applied the Brennan rule as if it were a holding. Hernandez was a 
section 1983I97 claim by a landowner against the city and its mayor 
for alleged deprivation of property without due process of law and 
without compensation in violation of the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments as a result of the city's failure to rezone the plaintiff's 
land. Even though the court noted that San Diego was a suit under 
state law, it found Justice Brennan's reasoning equally applicable to 
a section 1983 suit.I 98 It concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to 
even in such a case, a landowner may bring an action under section 1983 for a fourteenth 
amendment due process violation. I d. See also infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
195. Devines v. Maier, 665 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1981), expressly relied on Justice 
Brennan's opinion to hold that a regulatory taking of plaintiff's leasehold rights is compensa-
ble under the fifth amendment. In so holding, the court rejected the City of Milwaukee's 
argument that, since the plaintiffs in the case were tenants of uninhabitable tenements, the 
latter had no enforceable rights to begin with. It also rejected the City's argument that police 
power enforcement of a housing code does not result in a taking which is subject to compensa-
tion. See also Burrows v. City of Keene, 121 N.H. 590, 432 A.2d I5 (1981) where the court 
again relying on Justice Brennan's opinion held that the City's zoning of plaintiff's property 
such as to include it in a conservation district constituted a compensable regulatory taking. 
196. 643 F.2d 1188, reh'g denied, 649 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1981). 
197. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (amended in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979)) provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in action at Jaw, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding 
for redress. 
The term "person" includes municipalities and other local governing bodies. See Monell v. 
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Section 1983 applies to zoning cases. 
In Lake County Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979), the 
court also denied eleventh amendment immunity to the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (an 
interstate compact agency) but held that the agency members are absolutely immune from a 
damage suit when they act in a legislative capacity. Section 1983, however, does not provide a 
cause of action against the state because of the state's eleventh amendment immunity. See 
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). The holding of Quern, therefore, protects state land use 
regulation from attack. It should be noted that a section 1983 damage claim is, of necessity, 
different from an inverse condemnation claim. Although the measure of damages in a section 
1983 claim includes the damages caused a landowner by his inability to develop or use his 
property during the period an unconstitutional action was in force, it does not seek forced 
compensation for the property. Nevertheless, a section 1983 claim parallels an inverse con-
demnation claim. See Stubbs, Use of Civil Rights Law by Property Owners, 1981 INSTITUTE ON 
PLANNING, ZONING, AND EMINENT DOMAIN, SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION 213, 225; see 
also Bley, Use of the Civil Rights Acts to Recover Money Damages for the Overregulation of Land, 
14 URB. LAW. 223 (1982). 
198. Hernandez, 643 F.2d at 1200. 
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prove damages "in an amount equal to just compensation for the 
value of the property during the period of the 'taking."' 199 
Although the Hernandez court found the Brennan rule applica-
. ble to section 1983 suits, it introduced a major modification to it. It 
questioned the wisdom of establishing as, Justice Brennan proposed, 
the date of taking as the date of the enactment of an ordinance. 
Therefore, it stated that a taking does not occur "until the munici-
pality's governing body is given a realistic opportunity and a rea-
sonable time within which to review its zoning legislation vis-a-vis 
the particular property and to correct the inequity." 200 
The Hernandez modification of the Brennan rule is reasonable 
and accords with the notion of exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies. 201 First, until a landowner has applied for a variance or permit, 
it is difficult to determine whether he has suffered any harm to begin 
with. Second, considering the pervasiveness and importance of land 
use regulations, the regulating authorities should be given an oppor-
tunity to consider the effects of a regulation on a particular individ-
ual and to make particularized determinations. Finally, such a rule 
would, on the one hand, offer a governmental agency an opportunity 
to save itself from potential financial liability by acting expedi-
tiously and, on the other hand, would enable property owners to 
force reasonably quick decisions by the government. 
T,he Brennan rule as modified by Hernandez is sound and should 
be adopted in Wisconsin. Hazardous and premature as it may be to 
predict in this murky area, the Wisconsin Supreme Court's willing-
ness to find a compensable temporary taking in an unprecedented 
context and its unqualified agreement with Justice Brennan's rule 
may well indicate the path taking jurisprudence will take in Wiscon-
sin. Moreover, quite apart from the court's further agreement with 
Justice Brennan that, ". . . the applicability of express constitu-
tional guarantees is not a matter to be determined on the basis of 
policy judgments made by the legislative, executive or judicial 
branches," 202 the policy arguments themselves do not conclusively 
militate against requiring the payment of compensation in police 
power taking cases. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
201. See Freilich, Solving the "Taking" Equation: Making the Whole the Sum of its 
Parts, 15 URBAN LAW 447, 473 (1983). 
202. Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d at 431, 334 N.W.2d at 74 (quoting San Diego, 450 U.S. at 661 
(1980)). 
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C. The Contending Policy Considerations 
The notion of allowing the remedy of inverse condemnation203 
for police power regulations, particularly those involving zoning, 
has been questioned on various policy grounds. 
The California Supreme Court204 has noted some of these con-
cerns: 1) the threat of monetary relief will have a chilling effect on 
police power regulatory functions and discourage innovative plan-
ning; 2) inverse condemnation awards will saddle local governments 
with unlimited financial burdens and thereby render budgeting pro-
cesses difficult; 3) a court to grant monetary relief in such cases 
"seems" an usurpation of legislative power; 4) determining the 
amount of compensation will be difficult; and 5) placing the plaintiff 
in the position he would have been before the zoning ordinance by 
issuing an injunction is a sufficient remedy. 205 
As persuasive and strong as these considerations may be, they 
can be countered with equally strong-perhaps even stronger-
countervailing policies. First, underlying the taking test in Wiscon-
sin is a fundamental policy judgment that weighs public benefits 
against individual losses. In other words, as the court has stead-
fastly said, where the burden of a police power restriction on an indi-
vidual for the benefit of the public is so great that it is more than he 
should bear as a member of the public, the restriction will be held to 
constitute a constructive taking. 206 Implicit in this balancing pro-
cess is some notion of fairness207 which protects the individual from 
203. Hagman, supra note 140, suggests a "third alternative," i.e., payment of "in-
terim damages." 
204. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 276, 598 P.2d 25, 30, 157 Cal. Rptr. 
372,377 (1979). See also Note, Inverse Condemnation: Its Availability in Challenging the Valid-
ity of a Zoning Ordinance, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1439, 1450 (1974); Baumgardner, "Takings" 
Under the Police Power-The Development of Inverse Condemnation as a Method of Challenging 
Zoning Ordinances, 30 S.W.L.J. 723, 736-38 (1976). 
205. Agins, 24 Cal. 3d at 275-77, 598 P.2d at 30-31, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 377-78. See also, 
Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 491, 499 
(1!l81). In this commentator's view, the position that equates excessive land use regulations 
with eminent domain takings and compels compensation in both cases suffers from a "com-
pensation syllogism." Id. at 498. The weakness of this position, however, is that its doctri-
naire and dogmatic adherence to the police power/eminent domain distinction compels it to 
elevate form over substance: that is, to deny compensation just because a case presents the 
exercise of the police power even when its effects are as harsh as when eminent domain is 
involved is to deny the fundamental policies served by the Just Compensation Clause. See also 
infra note 207. 
206. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 15, 201 N.W.2d 761, 767 (1972). 
207. As Justice Frankfurter said in United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 
(1947): "The Fifth Amendment expresses a principle of fairness and not a technical rule of 
procedure .... " Professor Costo¥lis has also suggested that a so-called "accommodation 
power" looks to "fairness" as the most reasonable means of reconciling the police power's 
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the excesses of governmental action, even when done in the name of 
the public good. That excess is measured by the taking test which 
requires a determination whether a restriction deprives a property 
owner "of all or substantially all beneficial use of his property."208 
At the same time, as the court indicated in Howell Plaza I, one ma-
jor reason that a claimant in inverse condemnation in public im-
provement cases must allege loss of all or substantially all of the use 
of his property is precisely to allow a governmental entity to exercise 
its legislative judgment. 209 
Implicit in the test, then, is the conviction that beyond a cer-
tain point the policy of protecting a government entity's legislative 
function collides with the constitutional guarantees of the taking 
and compensation clauses. Significantly, that point of collision, ab-
sent physical invasion, is the same whether the case involves police 
power regulations or condemnation blight. It would thus be anoma-
lous and unfair to deny recovery in police power taking cases simply 
because police power and eminent domain may be different or have 
differing doctrinal bases. 
Second, assumptions to the contrary notwithstanding, the mere 
repeal or judicial invalidation of a police power regulation does not 
compensate a landowner for the loss, no matter how great, that he 
may have suffered as a result of the regulation. 210 The argument 
that cautions against imposing considerable liabilities against the 
government ignores the staggering losses that overly harsh regula-
tions can impose on landowners. 211 
Third, the present structure of remedies, which is cast in terms 
of a total win or loss, is destructive of a comprehensive zoning plan 
since, under the present system, if a landowner successfully attacks 
a zoning law, his land goes completely unregulated.212 If inverse 
condemnation or interim damages were allowed, however, the pres-
absence of compensation and the eminent domain's requirement of "Just Compensation." 
Costonis, supra note 29 at 1049-60. 
208. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d at 15, 201 N.W.2d at 767. 
209. Howell Plaza I, 66 Wis. 2d at 728-29, 226 N.W.2d at 189-90. 
210. In San Diego, 450 U.S. at 655 n.22, Justice Brennan indicates: "[t]he instant 
litigation is a good case in point. The trial court, on April 9, 1976, found the city's actions 
effected a 'taking' of appellant's property on June 19, 1973. If true, then appellant has been 
deprived of all beneficial use of its property in violation of the Just Compensation Clause for 
the past seven years." Moreover, "[i]nvalidation hardly prevents enactment of subsequent 
unconstitutional regulations by the government entity." I d. Indeed, according to the advice 
of a California city attorney to fellow city attorneys, if the battle is lost in the courts, the war 
outside is not: "IF ALL ELSE FAILS, MERELY AMEND THE REGULATION AND 
START OVER AGAIN." Id. 
211. Hagman, supra note 140, at 134. 
212. Baumgardner, supra note 204, at 737. 
1466 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
sure on the landowner to have a restriction on his land lifted and the 
pressure on the courts to do so would be minimized. 213 
Fourth, the threat of financial liability may also help to induce 
governing bodies and citizens to consider carefully and seriously the 
consequences of a land use restriction and produce more rational ba-
ses of decisionmaking. If the consequences of a zoning restriction are 
to be felt only by the few, however, the majority are not likely to 
consider them with care, responsibility, and fairness. 214 
Fifth, the fear that local governments will be faced with unlim-
ited liability can be mitigated by adopting the "reasonable time" 
standard that the Hernandez court enunciated. Moreover, the fact 
that the taking will be found only when there is a total or substantial 
loss suggests that few takings requiring compensation are likely to 
be found. Also, since the measure of damages is the difference be-
tween the value of the property as regulated and its value as it could 
have been constitutionally regulated, 215 the possible financial expo-
sure of the government will be greatly reduced. Finally, proof that 
the restriction was the proximate cause of the substantial or total 
loss of a landowner's property, apart from other factors such as infia-
tion, can be difficult. · 
The contending policies reviewed above indicate that the case 
against inverse condemnation or interim damages for police power 
takings is not justified in principle or practice. Since the fifth amend-
ment and its Wisconsin counterpart are designed to bar the govern-
ment from imposing public burdens on a few people, and since the 
police power and eminent domain both can secure public benefits, 
denial of inverse condemnation recovery in police power cases 
merely because police power is the theory for the recovery is an argu-
ment based on formal distinctions rather than on substance. Just v. 
Marinette County216 is instructive on this point. The court upheld 
the ordinance in that case in order to preserve the environment in its 
natural and pristine state. While environmental preservation is 
surely a laudable goal, it need not have been achieved by, in effect, 
forcing the landowner to dedicate the land to public use. An alterna-
tive would have been to uphold the ordinance but to compensate the 
owner for his permanent loss. The solution was probably not avail-
213. I d.; see also Dunham, From Rural Enclosure toRe-Enclosure of Urban Land, 35 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1238, 1253 (1960). 
214. Dunham, supra note 213, at 1253-54. 
215. Hagman, supra note 140, at 132. 
216. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972). The court has since limited the force of its 
holding in that case to the special concerns of environmental legislation. See Howell Plaza II, 
92 Wis. 2d at 85, 284 N.W.2d at 892. 
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able to the court because the taking jurisprudence dogmatically as-
sociates one remedy with one form of power or other. This persis-
tence in an all or nothing approach, however, can drain the federal 
and state guarantees of compensation of their content in particular 
cases. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Zinn presented the Wisconsin Supreme Court with an unprece-
dented "taking" question. It thus provided the court with a major 
opportunity to clarify some of the ambiguities of prior case law. 
Zinn has established that a taking is no less a taking because it is 
temporary. It has further established that once a taking is found, 
albeit temporary, the Constitution demands payment of compensa-
tion and that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is no bar to a claim 
of taking. Furthermore, although the test for taking in Wisconsin is 
rather restrictive, Zinn stands for the propositions that the test is 
uniform and that the context of the taking is constitutionally 
irrelevant. 
The Zinn court's adoption of a unitary test for a variety of con-
texts, absent physical invasion, and its finding of a compensable 
temporary taking in an unusual context suggest that Zinn may have 
implications on the compensability of regulatory temporary tak-
ings. The court's broad agreement with the San Diego dissent re-
garding the constitutional irrelevance of the context and duration of 
taking makes the suggestion even stronger. 
Awarding compensation for temporary takings is bound to ex-
pand to some degree the scope of inverse liability of the state as well 
as some local governments. For that reason, some have advanced 
policy grounds to limit the remedy for regulatory takings to mere 
invalidation of a police power regulation. While the force of these 
policies is considerable, equally forceful are the policies militating in 
favor of compensation in order to protect landowners from severe 
uncompensated losses. In Wisconsin, moreover, since the restric-
tiveness of the taking test is itself a product of these same competing 
policies, and allows a finding of taking only in extreme cases, it 
would be unfair to leave the individual owner with all the losses de-
spite "express" constitutional guarantees, simply because a piece of 
legislation happens to be enacted under the police power. Therefore, 
in the future, courts should drop the "taking" metaphor and the ali-
or-nothing approach to remedies and allow inverse condemnation 
recovery even in zoning cases once they have determined that a reg-
ulation has resulted in a taking. 
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Finally, whether or not Zinn governs regulatory cases, the Zinn 
opinion and that of San Diego are bound to send a powerful message 
both to the regulators and the regulated. The enhancement of the 
protection of private property that these two opinions represent is 
likely to encourage landowners to seek damages instead of injunc-
tions they have sought in the past. At the same time, if a regulatory 
taking is held to be compensable, the regulators will be more likely 
to plan carefully and within constitutional limits than they have 
been heretofore. 
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